The curious case of post-Cold War NATO

International relations are a lot like a high-stakes poker game: The better one does, the more confidence he or she acquires, the greater the hopes of spectators and the greater the fears of opponents.

At the end of the Cold War, NATO seemed to be on an unstoppable winning streak. Having survived its own raison d'etre; outliving both the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, NATO, flush with "victory," embarked on the curious path of becoming an enforcement arm of the prevailing international order based on several UN-inspired points of reference such as promoting human rights, preventing armed conflict and crisis and conflict management (within and beyond the North Atlantic region), even if these came at the cost of NATO's overall strategic purpose and security of its members and territory.

NATO's lack of strategic purpose stems from the belief, among NATO members, that it "won" the Cold War. While this assessment is partially true, it ignores the strange brew of national-independence movements that sprang up throughout the USSR and democratization within the Russian Federation that resulted in a process of mass secession rendering the USSR and its political, military and economic leadership unable to govern with a legitimate mandate.

Had NATO understood the impact of the USSR's collapse in strategic terms, it probably would not have moved, as swiftly as it did, to "plug the gaps" left in the USSR's wake: extending into the post-Soviet space, proliferating a specific value system and, in doing so, becoming complacent in its strategic management. After all, NATO won the Cold War and was entitled to determine the spoils of victory.

Now, in 2009, NATO is celebrating two milestones: its 60th anniversary as a functioning alliance, and 10 years since its first major expansion into the former Soviet sphere of influence. However important these milestones are, and despite the positive air surrounding official NATO pronouncements on its current international role, the future of NATO is bleak.

While there is an array of security-related concerns afflicting NATO members, it seems to be an alliance in search of a strategic mandate based on the realities of the 21st century. From the end of the Cold War until now, NATO has behaved as though its hegemony would carry on forever. However, just as in a game of poker, when the stakes are high, people do drastic things. In international relations history, the most recent and devastating blow to NATO - one that has undermined the long-term viability of the alliance and increased all its members' vulnerability - were the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States.

These attacks signaled that the United States - the main political and military pillar in NATO - was vulnerable to asymmetrical warfare. However, it was not the attacks themselves that undermined NATO as much as what followed; the invocation of Article 5 (committing all NATO members to collective defense) and the United States' rejection of allied support in favor of utilizing a "coalition of the willing" to invade Afghanistan and initiate regime change. So, at NATO's defining moment, when all its members were willing and able to assist the United States, it decided to utilize another alliance type - one that would not require much coordination or make ethical demands on the U.S. military (as NATO had during Operation Allied Force in 1999). Only after the initial invasion of Afghanistan did the United States invite NATO to conduct "special operations" and post-conflict objectives more related to peacekeeping than war-fighting or collective defense.

It is interesting to note that since the Afghanistan episode NATO's priorities have shifted. At a time of growing geopolitical threats, it is remarkable to watch NATO squabble about maintaining troop levels capable of delivering humanitarian aid to the far reaches of Afghanistan, and deploy state-of-the-art equipment as part of a "hearts and minds" strategy, but not do what NATO is meant to do: namely, win wars and provide security for its members.

Presently, the Euro-Atlantic community faces real and growing strategic threats, emanating largely from a resurgent Russia. Whether discussing the militarization of the Arctic, interference in Europe's gas supplies or the wanton display of military force against Georgia - NATO's ally and a potential member - the Russian menace is clear. However, NATO seems either unwilling or unable to confront Russia, even diplomatically, and instead rewards Russian belligerence by restarting the NATO-Russia Council.

So, let's get this straight: NATO prefers to participate in the "war on terror," delivering humanitarian aid to Afghanistan rather than advancing a proper strategic mandate to counter Russia, a state which has the potential to threaten nearly every NATO member directly?

The only policy that NATO has embarked on to counter Russia has been to expand eastward, though it seems such expansion is more designed to assist in value proliferation rather than provide a strategic edge over Russia. This may help explain why, when given the chance to send a clear message to Moscow over NATO's resolve to defend its interests and allies, NATO balked and did not deepen its relationship with Georgia or Ukraine, both of which are now more exposed and vulnerable to raw Russian influence.

In a world that continues to be anarchic in nature, NATO has a bizarre tendency to avoid dealing with real strategic questions, and opts for an approach that is softer, dealing with humanitarian concerns. Of course, humanitarian concerns are important, especially in a world where the rule of law is not adhered to; however, the long-term human rights of the citizens of NATO countries should not be taken for granted or bartered away for promoting human rights in non-NATO states. Security starts at home, and NATO needs to ensure that its actions do not inadvertently undermine its own defensive capacities.

Of the variety of potential problems facing NATO, most are geopolitical in nature, a fact that again begs the question of why NATO continues to focus on nongeopolitical missions?

Whether exploring the EU as an independent security actor or the new regional balancing alliances of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), one thing is certain: NATO cannot properly address the security concerns of its members by chasing after bin Laden in the Afghan mountains. It needs to formulate a proper strategic mandate and develop the tools required for fulfilling that mandate. If 2009 is not to be the last NATO milestone, a complete reconsideration of the nature of international affairs, and NATO's role in it, is necessary. Surely this is no easy task, but having a political leadership out of touch with international realities ensures NATO's demise.

Winston Churchill once remarked that Russia was "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." It seems that roughly 20 years after losing its self-prescribed raison d'etre, a similar characterization could be applied to NATO. Only clarity of purpose and thoughtful strategic planning can provide NATO with the ability to project itself as an alliance constructed for collective defense and, once that has been achieved, an alliance able to support the international community as a regional and international security provider, based on the ethics of the UN and international community at large.

- The author is program coordinator for the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Metropolitan University Prague.

Mitchell A. Belfer can be reached at
features@praguepost.com