A new phase

The recent departure of the last U.S. combat troops from Iraq symbolizes the transition to a civilian-led mission where security is but one element of a bilateral relationship. This transition is possible thanks to the accomplishments of the Iraqis themselves and U.S.-led coalition forces. Indeed, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) - military and police - have made admirable strides, and now credibly conduct counter-insurgency and counter-terror operations. 

Even as U.S. combat troops depart, however, Iraq lacks a stable government with a popular mandate. Six months after parliamentary elections, international efforts to move political blocs closer to agreement have not overcome wrangling based on personal animosities or ethno-sectarian mistrust, and important policy decisions continue to wait.  As ordinary Iraqis' confidence in the civilian political process ebbs and seasoned American observers remind us of Iraq's coup-ridden history, senior Iraqi military leaders themselves have appealed for U.S. forces to stay past 2011. As "Operation Iraqi Freedom" gives way to "Operation New Dawn," security concerns should therefore remain paramount in the U.S. relationship with Iraq, necessitating an American military role likely much greater and longer than currently envisioned.

This role involves aiding the ISF in the field, developing its institutions and crafting a mature national security decision-making community in Iraq. To start, Baghdad is not self-sufficient in regards to national defense. While capable of urban counter-insurgency, the Iraqi Army and police do not yet possess a logistical capability permitting sustained operations. Further, the Iraqi military cannot yet fully assert territorial sovereignty. This requires robust air defenses and ground forces able to counter an opponent's land army. While Iraq is likely to acquire U.S.-made F-16s and other advanced aircraft, it will be several years before these are fully integrated into the Iraqi military. This gap in time will require U.S. provision of airspace security, while the very process of integrating advanced aircraft will entail a U.S. training presence extending well beyond 2011.

Likewise, Iraq has begun to acquire U.S.-made M1A1 tanks, Stryker armored vehicles, additional mechanized assets and helicopters. Some of these systems are appropriate to current security challenges, while others - high-performance aircraft, tanks, etc. - are more aligned with a large military capable of territorial defense and deterrence. Though Iraqis remain unsure about where to weight force development, any leaders of a state such as Iraq, sandwiched among heavily armed neighbors, will likely seek over time to acquire a military whose size and equipment assert sovereignty and international weight.  This effort to develop such a force will entail extended reliance on the United States for training, advising and assistance in provision of national defense.

Beyond force development, a strong military content to a civilian-led mission becomes even more essential due to the fundamental fact that Iraq's national security decision-making institutions remain underdeveloped given the challenges they face. These challenges relate both to building a military force as well as to civil-military relations - how "suits" and "uniforms" interact. As for force building, many of today's senior Iraqi military leaders came up through the ranks of the Ba'thist Army. This army was built with little consideration for budgets, though with much attention to the heavy armament symbols of national sovereignty.

Other senior leaders in the Iraqi military and Defense Ministry have attained their positions due to their affiliations with influential political blocs in the government. Their political reliability has helped them to move into leadership positions in spite of military inexperience. Both groups of military leaders have not benefited from exposure to building a force in specific relationship to current or projected threats. Beyond these unformed leaders, rivalries among civilian leaders within the government's ministries result in force-building decisions being held hostage to political party jockeying.

As for civil-military relations, Iraq's "suits" and "uniforms" have only dangerous models in their history. Up through 1968, the Iraqi state was the prize over which groups of contentious Iraqi officers fought. After Saddam Hussein established hegemony in 1978, he gutted the military of all but the most obsequious senior leaders, raised up alternative military forces loyal to him alone - the Republican Guards - and then turned the state and its resources into the property of Iraq's security services. Iraq's new civilian leaders have not yet fully transcended that paradigm.

Appointments to senior positions in the military are frequently made based on party or sect loyalty, with mistrusted officers often marginalized. Likewise, over the past few years, parallel security organs have emerged that report directly to the prime minister or his advisers, at times obstructing other forces. As such, civilian leaders have sought to control, reign in or stack the decks of the ISF's leadership at least as much as they have worked to develop it as a force capable of defending Iraqis. Such practices do not cultivate trust and confidence among senior military leaders - in themselves, each other or in the civilian political echelon. These practices also discourage initiative and encourage political alliance-making as well as corruption as survival mechanisms.

To be sure, Iraqis and their coalition partners faced the daunting task of building their security forces largely from scratch in the midst of an insurgency and absent any sort of consensus among political leaders. The performance of the ISF today is therefore a noteworthy accomplishment. Still, to ensure Iraq transcends its pre-2003 legacy while countering the threats of today and tomorrow, the United States and its partners now need to focus on developing a fully professionalized national security leadership consisting of officers and civilians capable of building a force truly capable of national defense and who lead it competently based on relationships of respect and trust.

To do this, the United States must seek to continue the presence of advisers and mentors among Iraq's senior-most national security leaders. Just as these leaders are both uniformed and civilian, so too must the American contingent be a mix of both, working in concert to encourage healthy structures, interactions and processes while visibly supporting leaders who embody the best practices. Yet, while an important bridge to the future, these senior leaders are not themselves the future. Rather, the future of Iraq's national security and civil-military relations relies on today's junior and midgrade officers.

To assist this group, the United States must offer a broader panoply of security assistance than has heretofore been appropriate. This should include a critical mass of seats in American officer schools, at the captain-through-colonel level, as well as access to some of the same academic and other fellowships for which U.S. officers can apply. Assistance should also include provision of U.S. instructors and advisers at Iraq's own emerging officer schools and training courses, as well as Iraqi exchange officer postings to U.S. units. 

Likewise, the United States should provide matching opportunities to emerging civilian officials and politicians, through funding internships in U.S. government offices and study programs at American universities and by supporting public administration programs at Iraqi universities. The United States might also appeal to its NATO allies to provide similar opportunities to Iraq's emerging military and civilian leaders. Undergirding this assistance must be a strategic goal of a future Iraqi national security leadership that is fully competent in technical terms and fully professional in its civil-military relations.

Operation New Dawn does indeed signal a new phase in the U.S.-Iraqi security relationship, and today's improved stability amounts to a critical breathing space.  Bilateral security cooperation now must focus on ensuring a fully professionalized officer corps and a national security decision-making community that is cohesive, mutually trusting and focused on building a force to counter threats to the state and society.  Undertaking this mission is bound to be costly. Done prudently, it will require more than the dozens to hundreds of military personnel currently envisioned by senior U.S. administration officials. Rather, it might necessitate hundreds to thousands of military advisers, trainers and combat-ready troops. It will also require long tours in Iraq for exceptionally qualified U.S. personnel over the next decade at least. Still, this continuing effort is necessary in order to secure political victory in Iraq and gain a true partner in regional stability.

Absent such a commitment, the United States risks creating the conditions whereby civilian politicians compromise security advances and the military is drawn back into politics. Iraqis have endured too much - and American security interests in the Persian Gulf region are too great - to permit this. 

- The author is a defense fellow at the Washington Center for Near East Policy. He previously worked as a political scientist at the Rand Corporation and served on the faculty at Harvard, the University of Pennsylvania, the U.S. Naval Academy and elsewhere.

Barak A. Salmoni can be reached at
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