Exit strategy

This month saw the withdrawal of all U.S. combat units from Iraq, leaving behind 56,000 troops whose mission, according to U.S. generals, will be limited to training, mentoring and supporting Iraqi security forces. But Washington's already-weakening influence in Iraq and the Middle East over the past year has rendered the ongoing reduction in troops insignificant.

Long before this most recent withdrawal, and while combat troops were still in Iraq, Washington had already decided on a diminished role in Iraq. The United States' refusal to hammer out a deal for the formation of a new Iraqi Cabinet, more than seven months after the March parliamentary elections, attests to Washington's determination to minimize its role.

Among the explanations for this declining interest is President Barack Obama's promise - during his electoral campaign - to refocus U.S. attention on the war in Afghanistan.

Since Obama's election 20 months ago, American generals have gradually minimized the United States' military role in Iraq, while at the same time rechanneling resources to Afghanistan and, to some extent, Pakistan. Not only has Afghanistan seen a surge in the number of NATO - mainly U.S. - forces, but the number of American drone attacks against targets in both Afghanistan and Pakistan has multiplied exponentially. However, the shift in U.S. military attention from Iraq to Afghanistan cannot account, by itself, for waning influence in the Middle East.

While bogged down in an Afghan quagmire, a host of issues outside the Middle East also required Obama's immediate attention. The U.S. financial meltdown of 2008, the slow economic recovery that has followed since and a serious threat of deflation amid stubborn unemployment that hovers at around 10 percent have so far consumed Obama and his administration, leaving little room for other issues.

Unlike his predecessor George W. Bush, under whose terms a housing bubble helped fund an economic boom, Obama was dealt a much tougher hand domestically, inheriting that burst bubble. Forced to choose between a shaken economy at home and endless rivalries and bickering in the Middle East, Obama looked inward.

Accordingly, since taking office in January 2009, Obama's foreign-policy record in the region has lingered between naive and indifferent.

On Palestinian-Israeli peace talks, Obama committed a grave mistake when he called the Israeli settlements in Palestinian territories illegal, without backing it up with intentions to twist Israel's arm, and for it to end its peace process-killing settlement activity.

Obama's inexperienced misstep forced Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to walk out on talks until Israel freezes settlement activity, unlike in the past when Abbas had participated in negotiations despite continued Israeli construction in the occupied territories. The U.S. president effectively obstructed the very peace talks that he was seeking to espouse. A year later, he admitted the error in an interview, saying he had underestimated the intricacies of the peace process.

The announcement of the resumption of talks last week brings with it little optimism, given Obama's inability, or unwillingness, to force any concessions on either party.

In this area, Obama also reversed a cornerstone policy of his predecessor: Spreading democracy under Bush became supporting democracy under Obama. And even Obama's promise of support proved to be lip service as Washington cut funding to human rights activists in Egypt, Syria and other Middle Eastern countries.

While cozying up to Arab autocrats and cutting support for their opponents, Obama was not willing to pay - and rightly so - the price required to sell his new policy of befriending dictators in Washington, where Republicans prevented any practical implementation - like attempts to directly engage with Syria.

Close to two years after his election, Obama has extended the Bush-imposed sanctions on Damascus and has not used his authority to bypass the Republican hold on sending an ambassador back to Syria. This shows that while the president's policy on the Middle East may be different from his predecessor's, the region and its affairs are far from among his top priorities, and not something he sees as worth fighting for.

Most importantly in Iraq, where the United States has invested vast treasure and blood, Obama has been keen to supervise a quick, albeit honorable, exit for his troops.

Not only has Obama said a full withdrawal will take place by December 2011, but U.S. diplomats who dominated the Iraqi scene over the past seven years have already taken a backseat in Iraqi politics.

While word in Washington has it that the United States has so far refused to force the formation of an Iraqi coalition Cabinet out of fear that whatever faction left out might eventually turn against the United States - leaving a political vacuum and further throwing security in question - the policy raises serious doubts about the wisdom of American strategy.

To give Obama credit where it is due, mending U.S. ties with Russia and the successful diplomacy of enforcing further sanctions on Iran - while not end results in themselves - show that the administration has carefully arranged its priorities while picking both its fights and friendships.

Unfortunately for the Middle East, and Iraq, with few successes for the past half-century, Obama has likely decided that the sooner the United States can get out of the region and its affairs, the faster it will be able to restore U.S. world leadership, or at least become a global first among equals.

While Obama ends the United States' unilateral endeavor in Iraq, he takes on Iran multilaterally - mainly through complicated UN negotiations. Turning from unilateralism to multilateralism might best explain the United States' fading interest in Iraq. The withdrawal of U.S. troops comes as a consequence of this larger foreign-policy shift, and it is within this context that one should view such changes.

Iraq, its politics and its affairs at large have shot down from the top of the list of U.S. priorities to somewhere near the bottom. By the end of 2011, Iraq will be part of history, and it will be up to history to judge the failure or success of the United States' Iraq mission.

Meanwhile, Iraq is gradually becoming the business of Iraqis. If all the bickering and political jockeying that has so far prevented the formation of a Cabinet and led to a minor surge in violence are any indication, the Iraqis do not seem able to handle the affairs of their country after U.S. withdrawal.

Iraqis should realize that it will be a long time until they receive as much international attention as they have over the past seven years. It is up to them now to either run their nation successfully or stay entrenched in their political positions, thus extending the deadlock, to the detriment of Iraqis and the Middle East in general.

- The author is the Washington, D.C. correspondent for the Kuwaiti daily Al-Rai and a visiting fellow at Chatham House in London.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain can be reached at
features@praguepost.com