Betting big

The premeditated murder of 46 South Korean sailors aboard the Cheonan warship March 26 has peaked tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Had the Cheonan sunk without a loss of life, perhaps the behavior of North Korea, its Machiavellian leadership and their Chinese crutch would have been shrugged off as another bizarre footnote in the history of an archaic reclusive state. However, since the sinking resulted in high casualties, it is important to explore possible motivations for the attack to gauge whether this crisis will continue escalating, and, if so, how far.

So, why did North Korea shatter nearly a decade of reconciliation efforts with South Korea and gamble with regional stability and the lives of millions of people? On reflection, four possible sets of objectives are evident that may have convinced North Korea that the time was optimal to conduct a relatively small operation and profit from post-attack political fluctuations.

The first possible objective is rooted in North Korea's domestic politics and the preservation of Kim Jong Il's ruling clique. Kim may have been looking to dispel rumors that his health had deteriorated beyond the capacity to govern. The Cheonan attack and the well-coordinated post-attack media blitz showed that Kim maintains control over the junta. In ordering a physical attack against South Korea and then standing up to international pressure, Kim was in fact saying, "I am the leader of North Korea, and there is no alternative until I choose a successor."

It is also important to remember that North Korea suffers from an acute "legitimacy gap" in that Kim rules without public consent and the country has few channels for public dialogue. Knowing that many civilians have also been anticipating post-Kim life, the Cheonan's sinking may have been used to create a rally-around-the-flag effect - in this case, the flag symbolized by Kim himself. In doing so, the regime was attempting to divert attention away from more pressing issues, like looming economic catastrophe.

The second potential objective was economic. If this was the actual rationale, then the international community is experiencing déja vu, since North Korea has often raised tensions to extort financial concessions in exchange for a return to the status quo. The Cheonan's sinking may have been ordered because reactions have become predictable: a stiffening of rhetoric, military brinkmanship followed by a tidal wave of diplomatic activity seeking de-escalation. During periods of de-escalation, North Korea typically requests (and receives) huge civilian aid packages, such as food and medical aid. Such an economic price tag is, for many, acceptable since it does not directly contribute to the North Korean military-industrial complex. However, this indirect support releases significant resources and affords North Korea the ability to continue to spend some 25 percent of its GDP on military procurements without having to ensure that its people are fed.

The all-too-familiar pattern of crisis (initiation followed by escalation and an international involvement for crisis de-escalation) is visible, and, given the timing of the Cheonan attack, Kim's price for peace is likely to be the extension of the United Nation's food aid, which is due to expire June 30. North Korea requires international support to feed its population, especially since its currency revaluation in December 2009 further undermined the won (KPW), resulting in increased poverty, blackouts and economic stagnation. However, murdering South Korean sailors for economic concessions is a grotesque act that has convinced many to redouble efforts to destabilize Kim's regime. If economic objectives prompted the Cheonan attack, North Korea miscalculated the willingness of the international community to open de-escalation negotiations and is now poised to lose more than it could have hoped to gain through extortion.

A third possible motivation of the attack may be understood within the nuclear proliferation context as a way of disrupting Russo-American nuclear relations prior to ratification of the START II Treaty, which sets in motion a general framework for nuclear reductions. It should be remembered that hours before U.S. President Barack Obama's 2009 Prague speech, where he presented plans for nuclear disarmament, North Korea tested long-range delivery systems, overshadowing Obama's plans and making clear that his vision of a nuclear weapons-free world was a pipedream when it came to dealing with the erratic North Koreans. Over the past two years, following the launch of the so-called Medvedev Initiative and Obama's famed reset in Russo-American relations, North Korea has become increasingly estranged from Russia and regards START as a means of deciding who may or may not possess nuclear weapons. If the attack occurred in this context, North Korea properly foresaw U.S. reactions, but failed to adequately anticipate Russia's, which has made it abundantly clear (by action) that it would rather do business with the West than politics with North Korea.

Another aspect to its nuclear objectives is North Korea's relationship with Iran. There is growing evidence that Iran is working closely with North Korea's nuclear scientists and strategists and that the former receives important technological know-how with the North Koreans being well paid for their involvement. Since North Korea is already internationally isolated, Iran, by default has become a primary ally. In light of this, the Cheonan's sinking may have been conducted to either redirect U.S. political and diplomatic attention away from Iran, thereby postponing any new sanctions by dividing the UN Security Council, or as a way of exposing an American credibility deficit where the United States might fail to unequivocally support an ally that had been directly attacked. Again, if this was the logic behind North Korea's attack, it was flawed.

There is growing consensus among the permanent Security Council members that nuclear proliferation needs to be stemmed. If North Korea thought that China or Russia would come to its political aid and split the Security Council (giving Iran some breathing space), they are now deeply disappointed since only China has not (yet) officially agreed to additional sanctions against North Korea (though China has noted it would not support "whomever" perpetrated the Cheonan attack). In short, the United States and the wider international community have the resources and will-power to deal with both North Korea and Iran, and if the objective was to split the Security Council, then North Korea failed.

Regarding the related attempt to discredit the United States, North Korea's actions actually reinforced the South Korea-U.S. alliance. While the United States is not prepared to use military force and is attempting to prevent South Korea from unilaterally engaging the North Koreans (since the latter is a politically unstable nuclear state with a million-person army), the United States has demonstrated solidarity, dispatching Hilary Clinton to Seoul, Tokyo and Beijing, declaring "cyber-war" against North Korea, reintroducing propaganda efforts and embarking on joint military exercises with South Korea.

A fourth and final possible motivation for the Cheonan's sinking is highly speculative, but bears the fingerprints of China. China is not simply an observer of North Korea's actions, but an active participant in efforts to exploit cracks in U.S. alliances and influence its own neighborhood. Since neither China nor North Korea has experienced democratization in foreign affairs, it is possible to speculate that the sinking of the Cheonan may have been coordinated between Pyongyang and Beijing not only to expose U.S. credibility deficits, but to raise the regional "peace-making" leverage of China. Less than 10 days after the attack, Kim made a rare trip to China and probably used the occasion to inform China of North Korea's military adventurism and ask for political support in the event that North Korea was fingered as the culprit. China's acquiescence to North Korea's behavior is altogether unknown, but, if it were ever revealed, it would indicate an even more sinister side to the sinking, confirming China's reach for hegemony and offering a taste of violence to come as two great powers heighten their regional competition. It must be said, though, that China's involvement in the Koreas remains dubious since any armed conflict would be unpredictable and China may rightly fear a South Korean victory (with U.S. support) that would produce a unified, democratic Korea of some 75 million people on its border.

Despite the sinking of the Cheonan, neither South Korea nor North Korea is currently on an intractable war-path. Yet, South Korea will have to respond with more than rhetoric, and threats from Pyongyang will have many in the international community working to de-escalate the dispute. It remains unacceptable to give in to blackmail, even nuclear blackmail, and the murderous North Korean regime must finally be held accountable for its actions even if doing so risks access to the Chinese market. If the road to Pyongyang runs through Beijing, it is time to construct a feasible roadblock until both states accept their international responsibilities and bury, once and for all, the politics of the Cold War.

- The author is director of the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Metropolitan University Prague and editor-in-chief of the Central European Journal of International and Security Studies.

Mitchell A. Belfer can be reached at
features@praguepost.com