Flying the flag

The results are in, sort of.

On March 7, Iraq held its second national parliamentary election since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. With an approximately 62 percent turnout, participation was high, and U.S. President Barack Obama and others were quick to commend the nation on its successful political process. Given that Iraq is a nation still suffering from the social and political effects of decades of repression, sanctions and war, it is impressive that the practical capacity to hold national elections exists.

That said, complaints of fraud were hardly insignificant, totaling nearly 2,000 within Iraq alone. Complaints from Iraqis abroad were also worrying, including a decision by the Iraqi Independent Higher Elections Commission (IHEC) in Syria to use figures for refugees that account for as little as one-fifth of Iraqis living there.

The nature of electoral politics in Iraq was laid bare when former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi claimed fraud occurred on a vast scale - when he was trailing in the vote count - followed by similar claims by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki as Allawi pulled ahead. Ultimately, the IHEC resisted this politically motivated pressure and, after a series of delays, announced the first uncertified results March 26.

Ayad Allawi's largely secular Iraqiyya list won 91 seats, Maliki's Shia State of Law list 89, the Iraqi National Alliance - backed by the radical Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr - won 70 and the Kurdistan Alliance 43. Two bombs tore apart a coffeeshop and a restaurant in Diyala province, which voted overwhelmingly for Allawi, two hours before results were announced, killing 52 people and wounding 75. Violence abated after the elections, but many predict it will rise sharply in the coming weeks as parties wrangle to form governing coalitions. Politically motivated violence directed at influencing negotiations is likely, and the threat of violence at the hands of al-Qaida-style groups, which would like to see a total collapse of governance, are also possible.

Allawi and Iraqiyya have merely won the first stage of what will be a long, drawn-out battle. Having 91 seats does not mean Allawi will be prime minister, and Maliki is still in the race. The eventual prime minister will be the candidate nominated by the largest bloc in Parliament, even if that bloc is a group that comes from a post-election reconstitution of factions. Negotiations behind the scenes are focused on who this should be, as well as key political issues, like the future of Kirkuk, an oil-rich city now under control of the central government but which the Kurds claim belongs in their own autonomous zone. Broadly speaking, two scenarios could emerge in the coming weeks: One would involve straightforward and simple agreements between the lists that went into the elections, and the second would involve the fracturing of existing lists and complicated negotiations to form new ones.

While the exact shape of the new government remains a matter of conjecture, certain things seem inevitable. The Kurds, fiercely independent but lacking the means to establish their own state, see that their political future is dependent on a connection with Baghdad. With 43 seats, they can continue in their role as parliamentary kingmakers. It also seems highly likely the prime minister will be an Arab Shia, as has been the case since 2003. In theory, Maliki could continue for another term, and he appears to be doing everything he can to remain in office. Kurdish politicians found him too aggressive, however, and a significant number from the popular Shia Sadrist movement would like to see Maliki gone. Even Maliki's own party, Da'wa Tanzim al-Iraq, an elitist Shia-Islamic outfit, would probably be ready to drop him if able to find an alternative leader from within party ranks. So far, no such person has emerged.

Allawi, prime minister from 2004 to 2005, has kept a low-profile since leaving office and only re-emerged as a major player in 2009. He appears to have the support of Arab governments because he is not as close to Iran as Maliki, though he would still be willing to do business with Tehran. Allawi, a secular Shia who also draws support from the Sunni community, also has good relations with the Kurds and could offer them some compromise in exchange for support. Ultimately, however, Maliki's list and the Iraqi National Alliance may have enough power to block him from being prime minister, meaning Allawi's party may also have to come up with a compromise candidate to head the government. Other than Allawi and Maliki, current Vice President Adil Abdul Mahdi and former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari are potential candidates for prime minister. If Maliki and Allawi find themselves in a deadlock, one of these lesser-known figures may take up the position.

The final status of Kirkuk, federalism, national reconciliation and legislation governing the oil sector are key issues that remain unresolved, and the upcoming period of negotiation will bring them to the fore. Iraqi politics are a highly pragmatic affair, and influential figures could make compromises on these divisive issues, if they can make personal political gains.

Economic reform is also an urgent priority. Iraq is too dependent on oil revenues, and a sudden fluctuation of prices could be very damaging to the economy. Early in 2009, international oil prices were so low there were worries the state budget wouldn't last past summer. The process of forming a government requires a discussion of these key issues, and progress toward resolving any one of them would be an achievement. If there is a failure to grasp this opportunity, however, it may be a long time before there is any forward movement. Negotiations in the coming weeks could produce expedient alliances that serve individual and party goals, but fall apart when tested with issues that require building consensus.

Iraqis have been promised a lot in the recent election campaigns. Given this, as well as the failure of the outgoing government to deliver even basic services, citizens will again expect a lot from whoever comes into power. If a perception grows that authorities are not delivering, any semblance of tentative stability would be gone. This period of negotiation is a period of uncertainty, and another concern is that security forces cannot always be trusted to remain politically neutral.

In addition to security issues, Iraqis are faced with serious social problems. The deputy minister for planning recently announced that 32 percent of Iraqis live below the poverty line, a figure that rises to 39 percent in rural areas. Iraq has a significant unemployment rate, at around 18 percent, and a young population that disproportionately bears the brunt of that unemployment. The combination of poverty and readily accessible weapons means that crime and violence have become a way of life. Officials and security personnel are frequently implicated in crimes, and Iraq was rated the fifth most corrupt country in the world by Transparency International. Political analysts decry the way in which resources are allocated to regions, based on reciprocal support for a particular political faction. The development of the free press that is vital to accountability is stymied by the violence and abuse to which journalists are subjected.

Elections are just one of several key developments that will impact the future of the country. By August, the United States is supposed to have completed its withdrawal of combat troops, leaving in place 50,000 "advisers" to support Iraqi security forces. Despite an air of optimism expressed by Iraqis over the withdrawal, there are many who feel this will result in a security vacuum, risking increased violence by various groups with an interest in fomenting instability.

On a positive note, amid the uncertainty, the election process provided an opportunity for civil society groups and NGOs to strengthen their standing. Many such groups were involved as election observers. The development of civil society illustrates that ordinary Iraqis are keen to express themselves and do not intend to rely solely on politicians to build a stronger nation.

As a political stalemate may be to come, these sorts of efforts will be even more sorely needed.

- The author is based in Amman, Jordan, and is the reporting officer for the NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq, a neutral and independent body for coordination, information exchange and advocacy that was established in Baghdad in 2003. The views expressed in this piece are the author's alone.  

Adil Wainwright can be reached at
features@praguepost.com