CEE Changes

The Prague Post published on July 5 an interview with European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Štefan Füle, a native of Sokolov in the Czech Republic. Below is the full text of the interview, where the commissioner goes into greater depth on what countries are in enlargement negotiations and how the situations in Belarus and North Africa affect the EC Neighborhood Policy.

His office aims to prepare states with a “European perspective”  to enter the trade bloc, and to support a “neighborhood” by promoting working relationships with nearby countries.

In October, the EC will meet to present its progress report on enlargement, with Croatia on the cusp of becoming the 28th EU member, and numerous other Balkan states in accession talks. This comes against the backdrop of questions about the sharp disparity between EU member state economies, as evidenced most strongly by the Greek fiscal crisis.

The Prague Post: Can you comment on the potential delays to Croatia’s accession caused by the Czech Republic’s controversial opt out of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Lisbon Treaty?
Štefan Füle: One of the advantages of the commissioners is that they do not, as a matter of rule, comment on domestic situations, particularly in the country they know they best. On the Croatian accession treaty and the ratification process, we have just concluded accession negotiations, and I expect the accession treaty to be signed sometimes at the end of this yea – maybe at the beginning of December. Then the ratification process of the 27 countries will start. I am not aware of any country having a problem with the idea of Croatia becoming the 28th member of the European union.

TPP: After Croatia, what is next on the enlargement agenda?
ŠF: I would like to first address speculation that, after Croatia, the door will be, if not closed, then almost closed, and that there could be a longer period before the next accession process, and what many people refer to as “enlargement fatigue.” I strongly belive both of these issues represent a myth. We want to stress that accession negotiations are credible, because they are based on a new approach to enlargement. For the first time with Croatia, we introduced using opening benchmarks and closing benchmarks, so the process [for all accessions] is much more rigorous. There are 138 benchmarks to open and close in 35 chapters, which means that member states had 138 possibilities of veto, because all these benchmarks had to be adopted by the member states by consensus.
It was always a proposal by the EC to have this or that opening benchmark or that closing benchmark to which candidate countries had to comply. All the benchmarks were the subject of consensus of member states, so that’s why I’m saying it is indeed a credible process.

TPP: So what are some countries that could be next for accession?
ŠF: The fact that Ratko Mladić is now in hoc, I think has created new momentum for enlargement, and in the pipeline there are some important movements.
There is a recommendation from the Commissoin related to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which as far as the commission is concerned is in the position to start accession negotiations. Only one political issue needs to be solved for the member states to agree with this recommendation, which is the name of the country.
Montenegro has been a candidate country since last December. Last year, members of the commission recommended candidate status and made it clear that before the accession could start, seven key priorities need to be implemented to be fully in conformity with the Copenhagen criteria. And I have to say Montenegro is doing an excellent job. It has been working hard since the end of last year, and there is a high level of consensus among political parties, and the process has included of the civic society organizations. So if they deliver on all those seven preconditions, the commission could in October recommend to start accession negotiations.
Why October? Because on the 12th of October, the commission intends to present their so-called progress report on enlargement. This is an annual report in which we, in both a very strategic regional point of view and also from the point of view of individual countries, x-ray the aspirant countries and candidate countries. So our assessment of the Montenegro progress will be made in the framework of this progress report.
Serbia is in a bit of a different situation than Macedonia and Montenegro. We were asked only last October to prepare an opinion to what extent that country delivers on Copenhagen criteria, and whether it fits to start accession negotiations. We have sent thousands and thousands of questions to Serbia, and are now actively collecting answers and sending a number of missions and having consultations. We are now working on the content and substance of the opinion. In the mean time, Serbia is addressing the ten concrete suggestions we underlined in the framework of last year’s progress report. Again, I cannot guarantee it, because the ball is totally on the side of Serbia, but if they deliver on these ten issues, then I can imagine that in stead of dividing the process between the candidates status and then later on accession negotiations, we might be in the position to recommend accession negotiations.
It’s interesting – in Iceland, it was never given a candidate status – why? Because member states decided to start accession negotiations with Iceland, and it was through that decision that it was logically understood that the country, while it is in the process of accession negotiations, is at the same time a candidate country. It was only in the case of the Western Balkans when in some cases, we are dividing the candidate status and the start of the accession negotiation. Maybe that’s a bit too technical, but I wanted to explain it a bit.
This is the most optimistic scenario. Again, I cannot give anyone a guarantee that this is going to happen. It is very much in the hands of the politicians, government parliaments and other important state actors in these three countries and whether they will be able to deliver on a number of issues in a way that allows the commission to recommend the start of accession negotiations. We are mobilizing them, and we are helping them to see that there is this possibility this year to move their countries to the next level of the enlargement process. We are of course assisting them as much as we can.
There are other countries in the Western Balkans that share a European perspective. In Albania, as it was in the case of Montenegro, we also presented opinions last year. But in the case of Albania, we have not proposed a candidate status, and instead of seven key priorities, we have listed twelve key priorities. The fact that at that time we did not propose a candidate status for Albania, and the difference between Montenegro and Albania, is that Albania was not delivering on one of the key Copenhagen principles – the stability of democratic institutions. I’m referring to the fact that contrary to Montenegro, the government in Albania on one side, and the opposition on the other side, are unable to find a way to cooperate in Parliament, and there is an ongoing political stalemate in the country since the last elementary elections in 2009. But again, there are no artificial obstacles put forward by us. They have the same opportunities as the three countries I have named. It’s only up to them to stop this political battle and find a solution to the political stalemate and to address these key 12 priorities as defined by the EC for the EC to recommend upgrading Albania’s status in the enlargement process.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH), I think there has been important development in March of this year when the foreign ministers agreed on a comprehensive policy that would move BH from the Dayton area, (the Dayton agreement was signed 15 years ago), to an EU area. What I mean is that among other issues, the ministers decided that we need to ensure that there is more of the EU in BH. They clarified under what conditions the application of BH to become a member state will be assessed positively, and we started very recently a structured dialogue with all the politicians in BH about some key issues of the enlargement process, starting with judicial matters. The ball is now on their side. The priority is to form the government – once the government is formed, I think there should not be further obstacles for BH to address those two conditions necessary for BH to apply for membership. The whole point is that once you apply for the membership, there’s this philosophy of more from the EU. The EU can dispatch a number of the instruments it has and supports which could help politicians from BH to address a number of the issues they face, and which they are not able to address through the Dayton agreement.
Kosovo has a European perspective too, and it has a list of issues related to the EUropean agenda that is rather big. A lot of time has been lost … In comparison to BH, I cannot say that there is such a clear, strong consensus among member states on the next steps for Kosovo. There is no problem with about the European perspective – there the consensus is clear and no one is questioning that. But there is no consensus on the next steps and the form of these steps because not all members of the EU recognize Kosovo as an independent state.
The last addition I want to make to this long explanation – I was talking about some specific agenda that needs to be fulfilled in each and every one of these Western Balkan countries to move forward on the enlargement agenda. I think it is important to say that in the case of Serbia and Kosovo, it is important that there is an ongoing dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade and that they achieve concrete results that improve living conditions of the people living in that region.

TPP: The focus really seems to be on the Balkans. Is that where it stops for now?
ŠF: It actually does not. When you look at it, we have finished the accession talks with Croatia. That does not mean there is no other country going through the accession process. There are ongoing negotiations. It’s not just with Western Balkan countries – there are two other candidate countries. The first is Turkey, where the accession process has already been going on for a number of years, and Iceland where this month we entered into the practical stage of accession.
After screening [Iceland’s] legislative and institutional framework this month we opened the first four chapters out of 35, and we have been able to close two chapters. So it’s important that the enlargement process is multi-dimensional, and does not only go in the direction of the Western Balkan.

TPP: What about concerns the EU could be weakened by further enlargement?
ŠF: Well, quite interestingly, it is the enlargement process which helps to overcome the disparity. This is the most effective instrument to overcome disparity, because through the enlargement process, the conditionality works in the best way that the EU projects its values to third countries. It is also through the enlargement process that the EU can assist those countries in a really substantive way to address not only those issues directly linked to the accession process and aligning with the EU, but also other issues including education, environment, and economic and social development. Again, all of that with the most effective use of conditionality. The support by the EU of these countries is conditioned by these countries’ accepting norms and procedures adopted in the EU. So the enlargement process is actually one that helps to address these issues of disparities in Europe rather than deepening them.
Another thought I want to add – I think it is also important to see the enlargement process as of course directly inked, but it enables membership without involving membership in the eurozone. One example is the Czech Republic. To become a member of the eurozone, you need to fulfill additional financial conditions.

TPP: How has the political situation in Belarus affected its place in the Neighborhood policy?
ŠF: Belarus is our neighbor, and it is in no one’s interest to isolate the country. It is in no one’s interest to pursue a policy where we just react to what the Lukashenko regime is doing. Before I start on that, let me say that there is no legal framework for a bilateral relationship between the EU and Belarus. So Belarus is not part of the bilateral dimension of Eastern partnership, but Belarus is part of the multilateral dimension of Eastern partnership. One of the reasons I believe that supporting that they continue to be a part of the multidimensional Eastern partnership is that the Belarussian problems are not just between Brussels and Minsk, but they are problems that are also being felt in other countries in the region. And because of that hopefully the other countries in the region will also be part of the solution.
What is new in the policy towards Belarus is two elements. First that compared to the past, we are now much more clear, concrete and thorough in restrictive policies against individuals who are clearly behind the crackdown on democratic forces. We have 192 names, including Lukashenko, and they are subject to the visa ban and free assets ban. And we had a number of the measures like the ban of the sale of arms, and other instruments which could be used against demonstrators, and restrictions on lending by European Investment Bank and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development. The last decision taken a couple days ago sanctions three companies which linked to financial interests to Lukashenko.
On the other side, at the same time, in a balanced way we are supporting the civil society and democratic forces through various programs. This time the EU was rather quick to offer financial assistance to the relatives of those detained after the Dec. 19 demonstrations. We helped them to cover the cost of the lawyers and to face a number of the challenges which arise because members of their families are being prosecuted by authorities. We are now offering a number of programs of assistance to help strengthen the civil society in Belarus. There is a program for students – a 4 million euro program for three years, starting this year in September, dozens of Belarusian students will be offered two to four years study abroad. And there are other program to make sure that we have not abandoned the citizens. This is a balanced approach – restrictions on one side, but at the same time making sure which side we are on.
The second new thing with Belarus is that we now have a rather clear idea – a clear vision about Belarus’ place in the European cooperation. In December, before the elections, members states agreed and recommended we were ready to negotiate with authorities, creating if not legal, at least political places for our bilateral relations. After 19th of December, of course, that process has been suspended – it was never started. But just yesterday, in Warsaw, on Thursday in Warsaw with [Polish] Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, we have started an informal dialogue with the opposition parties from Belarus about this vision of European Belarus. And we will continue that informal dialogue with them and the civil society organizations because we want to share this vision with the Belarusians. They should know what it is the EU offers, and what is the alternative to the policy Lukashenko is pursuing.

TPP: As a newer member state, how can the Czech Republic be a model of what and what not to do?
ŠF: In a way, it was easier for us to join the EU at the time when the enlargement was in the government policy a kind of sexy policy. There was no real controversy there – on the contrary, it was seen as a part of this post Iron Curtain reunification of Europe. At the same time, the pressures at that time were not so technically demanding. They have never faced the opening and closing benchmarks, they have not faced what we have applied in the case of Croatia and its so called track record. The track record means for enlargement, we are not interested anymore in just ticking boxes about whether that law has been adopted or that institution is established. We are now looking into how it works. Does it bring the effect? In the case of judiciary, are the courts in Croatia more independent, more efficient? These are the questions that are now at the focus of enlargement. Not just whether this law on independence has been adopted or not. That does not mean that we [the Czech Republic] do not have a lot to offer to the ongoing enlargement process and continuation of the enlargement process. I think we should be the one who helps to keep the door open. We are doing a lot bilaterally within the Visegrad Four group to make sure that we support these candidate countries, not just on a political level but also that we share all the experience we have. In each of these newcomers, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, each of them has something specific to offer. Sometimes it’s a good experience sometimes it’s a less good experience. And that’s life.

TPP: How is the Neighborhood Policy addressing the situation in North Africa?
ŠF: The North is changing – there is a tremendous historical process – some people are comparing it to the transformation of Central Europe. I think there is a reason why many call it Arab Spring. It is important that as the Southern Neighborhood is changing, so we are, the EU is changing. We have reviewed our neighborhood policy and we have adjusted this policy to be now in a much better position to support the democratic transformation of the countries. We have come out with the number of new ways and principles accepting that not everything we have been doing in the past really helped these countries to reform. We are moving the relationship from being exclusively only with authorities to a relationship with also the civic society organizations. We are introducing the principle of more for more – the more a country is ready to move on reforms, the more we will support it. We also introduced the less for less principle – the less a country is willing to reform itself, particularly on the values which are at the basis of our bilateral relationship, the less we will be ready to support it,  and we might even review our financial help and assistance in some of the programs.
We are offering the countries who embark on the difficult reform path to open our markets for them. The mobility partnership will not be limited only to the fight against illegal migration, but also widen significantly the avenues for promoting legal migration. We have come out with a policy of differentiation. We are now not trying to apply the same list of the principles for each of them. We understand our eastern neighbors have some preferences, and the south has different preferences. The countries have different interests and preferences. We have also decided to provide more financial resources to help these countries with their difficult reforms. And there is a lot in response to these changes, and the East is also going to benefit.
All of that is important for the following reason. Not only is it our direct neighborhoods – whatever happens there has and will have a direct impact on us – but at the same time it is only through being active and effective in our neighborhood that we will be able to strengthen our role as a global player. The vision of a global player without without us being able to help our neighborhood is false. And there’s one more principle this initiative will promote. Among the many new things this new policy has increased our role and our determination to strengthen in finding solutions to projected conflict, whether it’s in the Middle East, or whether it’s the Western Sahara. The first stage should increase confidence building measures or increase focus on confidence building measures,  and the second is external action service as a new instrument. External action will increase our ability, as well as allow a bigger political role in finding solutions with projected conflicts.