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Nato's new man

Jiří Šedivý speaks candidly about his prestigious new post, NATO and the missile-defense shield

By Kimberly Ashton
Staff Writer, The Prague Post
August 8th, 2007 issue

Jan Přerovský/THE PRAGUE POST

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Jan Přerovský/THE PRAGUE POST

Šedivý says his involvement with NATO is like "a love affair." enlarge

On July 30, Jiří Šedivý, 44, was appointed as NATO’s assistant secretary general for defense policy and planning. As one of seven deputies to Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, he will hold the highest position ever reached by a Czech in NATO. He starts the four-year post next month.

Before the revolution, few could have predicted the freelance guitar player, who was barred from attending university because he was the son of a dissident, would rise so high. But Šedivý’s life changed as rapidly as the country’s has since 1989.

Picked from a pool of 20 candidates, Šedivý has an impressive résumé. Allowed to start university at almost 30, within six years he had completed a degree at Charles University and become the director of the Institute of International Relations in Prague.

In 2005, he worked as a professor at the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies, in Germany, and the following year he was named defense minister.

That post, held in Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek’s shaky post-election coalition, only lasted two months. In January, Šedivý became deputy to Alexandr Vondra, deputy prime minister for European affairs.

Two days after his NATO appointment, Šedivý sat down with The Prague Post in his Malostranská office to discuss his new job, missile defense and the greatest threats NATO faces today.

The Prague Post: What will be your priorities regarding NATO defense policy and planning?

Jiří Šedivý: The major responsibilities are in three broad areas. [One is] defense planning and capabilities. What kind of forces should we have in NATO now, in five years, in 10 years, in 15 years? This goes to force planning, which is the second area, and it means a very concrete description of those kinds of forces, a portfolio of capabilities that NATO has at its disposal. And a very important third area is nuclear planning. Related to that is protection against weapons of mass destruction, which also includes missile defense.

TPP: What is your vision of the kind of forces NATO should have?

JŠ: The vision is derived from the long-term process of transformation, the last phase [of which] was started here in Prague at the last summit, in 2002. What is now important concerning those forces is sort of a wider capability package for operations. Also, nonmilitary aspects, [which] means involving nonmilitary actors in the very beginning phases of the planning. Those could be intergovernmental organizations such as the EU or the UN, but it could also be nongovernmental organizations. So a comprehensive approach and its implementation is one thing; another extremely important thing is the NATO response force.

TPP: What is that?

JŠ: The NATO response force is a concept that was agreed on here in Prague, and the idea is that NATO has at its disposal a pool of 20,000 multinational forces which are ready for immediate reaction, which means to be deployed within five to 10 days after the decision in the North Atlantic Council, anywhere in the world. It’s a huge exercise because you have a rotation plan. Each six months there is a response force on standby, and it consists [of troops] from various nations. It’s an extremely complicated process of, first of all, identifying those forces, or convincing nations that they should put their forces on alert for such a period, then to prepare them [and] certify that they are really on that level of readiness. The seventh rotation of the NATO response force [just ended] and the Czech Republic had its nuclear, biological, radiological, chemical protection unit — it means the weapons of mass destruction unit — of 460 people, earmarked for that period.

[Another] thing that is important is the question of complementing the current project of theater missile defense of NATO with the U.S. project of missile defense. [It is a] big debate indeed here in this country.

TPP: How would the NATO and U.S. projects harmonize?

JŠ: In NATO, we’ve got already quite a developed and partially implemented system of theater missile defense that is mobile and covers a small territory. Now we do not know exactly how to [harmonize the systems], but what is important is that we started to discuss this possibility and that all 26 nations agreed we are going now to explore those possibilities.

TPP: What is your view of the role NATO should play in any possible U.S. shield?

JŠ: We must exclude the option that the U.S. system would be under the control of NATO. It won’t be. If it comes to using those weapons, the ultimate decision is upon those who own them; that means the U.S. and the UK. And, given the technical aspect of such a missile defense, if it is used — and we have many ifs and many question marks around this — but if the system is implemented and is used, which would be already a catastrophic scenario, then it’s automatic. I mean, you have 20 minutes to decide whether to activate the system or not, so you have absolutely no time for political consultations. What is important are those preliminary consultations that actually explore all the aspects and also scenarios for such situations.

TPP: So NATO should be involved in general policy issues regarding the U.S. shield but not the decision to activate it?

JŠ: Indeed, it should be. If we speak about complementation and harmonization then we speak about consultations [and] about perhaps some technical complementing of those systems. It’s both politically but also technically absolutely impossible to put such a system under NATO control because you don’t have time for consultations and the United States would never accept it.

TPP: What is your view on whether the U.S. should station a radar here and silos in Poland?

JŠ: The decision to ask us and the Poles to provide a place for such installation is very much defined by technical aspects because this is a good territorial position for shooting down those rockets that would, or potentially could — we are speaking about a situation that could happen in 10 to 15 years — reach the United States. Now the question would be [whether] those parts of Europe that couldn’t, from a technical point of view, be covered by the strategic system of the U.S. should be in a complementary manner protected by that NATO short-range defense system. [The NATO system] is deployed, mobile and very flexible.

TPP: Do you think the Czech Republic’s discussions over the radar base and its cooperation with NATO deployments in Afghanistan influenced the secretary general’s decision to appoint you?

JŠ: I would say that what definitely helped is the reputation of the Czech Republic in NATO, which [has been] established not only by these current deployments or debates about the radar, [but is also] the result of our performance in NATO since 1999.

TPP: Is it significant to you that he chose somebody from a new member state for the job?

JŠ: I believe, actually, that this was another important factor. There was also a tacit understanding that, to balance the representation on this level of management, someone from a newer member would be preferred.

TPP: You’ve said that part of your job will be to define NATO’s strategic threats and risks. What are the most significant threats and risks that NATO faces today?

JŠ: It’s terrorism and various aspects of terrorism. Failed states are a big problem. They open this free space for terrorists, for transnational crime, drugs and things like that. That’s why we are operating now in such remote areas. It’s indeed proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and we perceive transnational crime and similar things sort of as a general threat. And I think we may expect, in the future, debates about security and strategy, [and] perhaps more emphasis put on energy security. Perhaps also we will have to look in a closer way at security aspects of environmental degradation.

TPP: Why would energy security be important to the alliance?

JŠ: I don’t know whether it would be; I’m just speculating. It’s due partially to how Russia operates with its energy power, or power derived from the fact that they are a major provider of resources, especially for Europe.

TPP: How might your appointment help the Czech Republic?

JŠ: It’s definitely a very prestigious position, but I should say and emphasize that from the very first day of my employment in NATO I’m ceasing to be a Czech bureaucrat and, being a NATO bureaucrat, my loyalty will be to NATO and to the secretary general. So, practically, I should forget about being Czech.

Kimberly Ashton can be reached at kashton@praguepost.com

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